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SYMPOSIUM

THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT? YOU
BET.
Peter Schrag*

By now, it is generally recognized that direct democracy,
and particularly the initiative process, has become
increasingly important as a policy-making instrument in the
United States. Some twenty-four states have an initiative
process in one form or another, and there have been efforts to
write it into the constitutions of several others. More
important, in the past decade, record numbers of initiatives
have been circulated and have qualified for the ballot,
particularly in Colorado, Arizona, and the high-initiative
states of the West Coast. Those initiatives have dealt with
virtually every fundamental public issue one can think of:
from ending affirmative action, curtailing bilingual education,
toughening criminal sentences, establishing legislative term
limits, limiting spending, and capping taxes, to permitting
casino gambling on Indian reservations, increasing the
minimum wage, imposing new environmental regulations,
creating new parks, and increasing support for public
education. It also includes some, like legalizing physicianassisted suicide, which one would not think of.
As this list indicates, while the contemporary wave of
ballot measures, and particularly those following, and often
prompted by, passage of California's Proposition 13 in 1978,
came disproportionately from the right, the left has become
* A.B., Amherst. The author was the editorial page editor of the
Sacramento Bee for 19 years, for which he continues to write a weekly column.
He is the author of PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S
FUTURE (1998).
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increasingly adept in the process and, in many instances, as
well financed. The big news last fall was that while voters
rejected vouchers, in both California and Michigan, they
generally supported higher pay for teachers and more liberal
funding formulas for schools, and continued the remarkable
success that Bill Zimmerman and his colleagues have had in
liberalizing state drug laws. But Zimmerman's measures,
like nearly all others, were also financed by deep pocket
funders-in his case by financier George Soros and two other
multi-millionaires.
Nationally, 396 initiatives appeared on statewide ballots
in the 1990s, and 289 in the 1980s. The only similar period
was in the Progressive Era between 1911 and 1920, shortly
after many states wrote the initiative and referendum into
their constitutions, when 291 were proposed.! In California,
to cite just one big state, nine measures made it to the ballot
in the 1960s, twenty-two in the 1970s, forty-five in the 1980s,
and sixty-two in the 1990s. In light of the small number that
made it to the ballot last November, and the surprisingly few
now in circulation, it is possible, maybe as a result of our
general prosperity, that this sharply ascending curve may
have dipped, at least for the moment.
But do not count on it. After 1990, when California
voters rejected a large percentage of the great glut of stuff
they were then confronted with, there were predictions that
the electorate was having no more of it. And then, of course,
the numbers started rising again. In Oregon last November,
voters were confronted with nineteen initiatives and
hundreds of pages of ballot materials.
In states like California, the impact of those ballot
measures on public policy generally, and particularly on
public services and infrastructure, has been enormous.
Homeowners are now assured that they will not get any
unpleasant surprises in their property tax bills. But after
five boom years, we are just now beginning to recover from
two decades of spending restrictions and tax limitations. For
example, within the next couple of years, California's perpupil school spending, which was fifth or sixth in the nation
in the mid 1960s, and which dropped to forty-first in the mid
1990s, may get back up to the national average, itself not an
1. Information compiled by the Initiative and Referendum Institute,
Washington, D.C.
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adequate level when compared to the other large industrial
states. It is particularly inadequate in a diverse, high-cost
And the counties have not yet
state like California.
recovered.
Of course, these ballot measures broadly impacted
legislative policy, which has been increasingly sensitive to
what voters have done, or may do in the future, on initiatives
in other states, and on national policy, which, on things like
the restrictions on services to immigrants in the original
welfare reform bill and tax limitations, has often reflected
voter-enacted state measures. More important, perhaps, has
been the effect on the political process itself. In states like
California, the basic fiscal and governmental structure has
changed, shifting far greater authority to the state
government. This more or less eviscerates the local power to
tax and plan, and thus, confounds accountability not only for
voters, but often even for those who are professionally
engaged with the process, such as government officials,
journalists, and academics. Who is responsible for mitigating
school overcrowding or for the red ink that forces a district to
cut programs and services? Is it the district that overspent
its budget or is it the governor and legislature who failed to
come through with the promised money? How does the
state's school finance system work? Why, with all that
property tax, can't city hall keep the streets paved?'
More important, virtually all initiatives circumscribe the
power of state and local elected officials, and often their
willingness, to deal with new problems. This in turn has
exacerbated voter frustration-already high anyway-with
elected politicians and officials, which increases the
propensity to resort ever more to institutions such as the
initiative and referendum that bypass those politicians.
Initiatives tend to beget initiatives.
In addition, tax limitation measures like Proposition 13
Because the
have skewed the local planning process.
property tax is now so limited, planners and city councils go
after sales tax payers like big box retailers, shopping malls,
and auto malls. As a result, other things being equal, they
pay less attention to an attractive balance between housing
and high-end employers in electronics or other high-tech
2. Of course, city hall no longer controls the property tax.
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industries, which tend to require more in services than they
return to the local treasury in higher property taxes.
Conversely, because assessments only change when property
is transferred-and sometimes not even then-measures like
Proposition 13 and its progeny have tended to reduce
turnover and stabilize neighborhoods.
Most fundamentally, the initiative has changed the
quality and the institutional character of the legislature
itself. The big driver has been term limits: In California
three two-year terms in the Assembly, two four-year terms in
the Senate. Freshman members now chair crucial policy
committees, speakers last no more than two years, and
almost everyone begins looking for their next job from the
moment he or she arrives. In Sacramento, the capitol is now
the state's plushest bus depot, where some people have just
arrived, some are just about to leave, and few stay very long.
Equally important, in an effort to curb bloated staffs and
reduce the number of political hacks, California' s Proposition
140 sharply reduced the legislature's own budget.
In fact Proposition 140 did not do much to eliminate
hacks. Instead it inadvertently drove out the policy people
and eviscerated the staff of the non-partisan and highly
respected legislative analyst. The hacks are still there.
Although it is impossible to prove, it is at least conceivable
that California's electricity deregulation mess would never
have happened without term limits.
Let us turn for a moment to some other issues. In the
past decade the so-called initiative industrial complex-the
network of consultants, direct mail specialists, petition
gathering firms, pollsters, and media firms-has become a
familiar part of the political landscape. And so, of course, has
the growing amount of money involved. While money and
paid political operatives played a role almost from the
beginning, the process was conceived as an instrument of
citizen action. It was to comprise two hurdles: qualifying a
measure for the ballot and getting it passed.
But in an era when, on the one hand, it is nearly
impossible in most states to qualify anything for the ballot
without paid petition circulators and, on the other, easy for
deep pockets initiative sponsors to qualify almost anything,
the first hurdle becomes meaningless as a test of citizen
commitment. Instead it becomes a barrier to it. At the same
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time, it becomes an open invitation to almost anyone who, for
reasons of ideology, economic self-interest, political
advantage, or simple vanity wants to become an instant
player. In Oregon last fall, one man, Bill Sizemore, who has
become a sort of one-stop-shopping initiative conglomerate as
developer, sponsor, and campaign organizer, qualified six
In the process, he forced the
measures for the ballot.
governor to change his own legislative priorities to fight the
most draconian of Sizemore's proposals. This process is
indeed a fourth branch of government.
Scholars like Daniel Lowenstein, Elizabeth Garrett, and
Elisabeth Gerber contend, more or less correctly, that while a
large money advantage is often sufficient to defeat an
initiative, it has rarely been sufficient by itself to pass one.
But without money-the money of self-interested politicians
and political parties, insurance companies, Silicon Valley
millionaires, or labor unions-initiative proponents cannot
get to the table at all. Gerber has found that without other
resources, the groups she defines as economic interests can
rarely use their financial power alone to prevail at the ballot
But in 1998, a coalition of well-heeled gambling
box.
interests seeking authority to run electronic slots in
reservation casinos spent $65 million in California to prove
they were poor Indians, and Nevada gambling interests spent
$25 million in their unsuccessful attempt to beat them. It
would be hard to describe this battle as anything but a fight
between large economic interests. The bigger spenders won.
Increasingly, moreover, the definitions become blurred
and the groups confused. Is the California Republican party,
which bankrolled the successful campaign to pass Proposition
209, the measure that banned racial and gender preferences
in public education and contracting, a citizens' group? Is U.S.
Term Limits, which is funded almost entirely by deep,
conservative pockets (and will not disclose how much it gets
Last
Are the public employee unions?
from whom)?
November, the Silicon Valley venture capitalists and other
proponents of Proposition 39, which lowered the margin
required to pass local school bonds from sixty-seven percent
to fifty-five percent, outspent their opponents at the Howard
Jarvis Taxpayers Association by roughly nine to one-$27
million to $3 million. In the process they managed to
befuddle enough voters, most of whom thought Proposition 39
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had something to do with fiscal accountability, not with
making it easier to approve bonds, to narrowly pass it. Is
Oregon's Bill Sizemore a citizens' group?
The defenders of the initiative process often contend that
the involvement of big money does not make it any different
in that respect from representative politics. But one of its
original justifications was precisely that difference. As the
Sacramento Bee editorialized back in 1913 shortly after
Hiram Johnson and the Progressives wrote the initiative,
referendum, and recall into the California Constitution:
"[T]he money changers-the legions of Mammon and Satanthese have been lashed out of the temple of the people." And
because the initiative is subject to so many fewer institutional
constraints, and because initiatives are, in most instances, far
harder to repeal and amend,4 the initiative structure actually
makes the role of money much more dangerous.
Scholars like Arthur Lupia contend that while voters
rarely have time to read the texts of initiatives and while
initiative fights are dominated by thirty-second television
advertisements and over-simplified mailers, voters get clear
enough signals when they know who backs and opposes a
measure. 5 And Robert Stern has often argued that voters
rarely regret the votes they have cast. But the conventional
legislative process, for all the logrolling that sometimes
accompanies it, is usually subject to a whole range of
institutional checks that the initiative is not-committee
hearings, two house agreement, executive veto, as well as the
intrinsic legislative impulse to compromise and accommodate
as many sides and interests as possible.
None of these checks occur in direct legislation, which is
a winner-take-all process that, by its very nature, is rarely
respectful of political minorities. In making their decisions,
the voters have no technical experts at their disposal; they do
not have the time to read the fine print, sometimes running to
many thousands of words of legal language, behind the
advertising slogans for and against particular measures; they
do not have to record their votes, much less confront those
3. SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 5, 1913, at 32.
4. In California, repealing an initiative is impossible unless the measure
itself allows for it.
5. See ARTHUR LUPIA, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN
WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998).
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who believe they have been damaged by those votes; they
cannot be run out of office if they make serious errors; they
are not accountable for the consequences to their fellow
citizens or the public weal. These differences have led some
scholars, the late Julian Eule of U.C.L.A. most prominent
among them, to argue that in the absence of other checks, the
courts, in reviewing the constitutionality of initiatives, should
apply stricter scrutiny than they do to conventional
legislation.6
In addressing the question of whether the initiative has
become the fourth branch of government, perhaps the most
telling element is the extent to which the process, once
regarded as something of an exceptional safety valve,
something outside the conventional political process, has
become part of it. As suggested above, the same political and
economic groups that direct democracy is supposed to checkinsurance companies, gambling interests, trial lawyers, labor
unions, tobacco companies, even the Southern Pacific
Railroad before its demise-have become major players. So,
of course, have the elected politicians and those seeking
public office. The best known is probably former California
Governor Pete Wilson, who successfully used Proposition 187,
the immigration initiative, and Proposition 194, the three
strikes measure, as a wedge in his 1994 campaign for reelection, and tried to use Proposition 209 in his abortive run
for the presidency in 1995-1996. There have been others as
well, including then-Secretary of State Jerry Brown with
political reform in the early 1970s, and former Attorney
General John Van DeKamp with campaign reform and
moderate term limits in his unsuccessful pursuit of higher
office in the 1980s.
In addition, the threat of initiatives can drive the
By gathering enough
conventional political process.
signatures to qualify a measure expanding the number of
charter schools and liberalizing the rules under which they
could be set up, in 1998 Silicon Valley millionaire Reed
Hastings put enough pressure on the California Teachers
Association to bring the union to the table and agree to a
somewhat more moderate version of the same plan. This is
not necessarily bad-indeed, it comes close to the kind of
6. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J.
1503 (1990).
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indirect initiative process that some states have and that is
now being proposed by reform groups in California. But if
you think of the panic over utility prices, driven in part by
fear of an initiative from the tempestuous consumer activist
Harvey Rosenthal that is besetting the Governor and
legislature this spring, and the extent to which Harveyphobia is already driving state policy, you have to re-examine
even this proposition. If you add to this the very evident
consideration that elected politicians like Bill Clinton and
Gray Davis now rely increasingly on overnight polls, focus
groups, and other instant voter surveys (the politician's daily
plebiscite) it indicates the extent to which the two seem
increasingly to become part of the same continuum. To
paraphrase Clausewitz, the initiative has become the
extension of politics by other means. All of this seems to
reinforce the near-certainty that, regardless of what courts
and legislatures may otherwise do, the initiative, which was
nearly dormant forty years ago, has become an important
part not only of policy making but also of the public
consciousness.
Given this fact and the corresponding impact of ballot
measures in limiting the powers, prerogatives, and careers of
elected government officials, it is hardly surprising that there
would be increasing legislative attempts to restrict the
process as well. Legislative term limits have been the most
pervasive of those career-restricting measures, which have
been written into the constitutions of eighteen states, in all
but one case through voter initiatives. But there are many
other examples as well, particularly in the area of campaign
finance reform. Some of those reforms have been struck down
by the courts, as have all initiative-based attempts to impose
congressional term limits.
But in state after state,
legislators, sometimes backed by special interest groups, have
been seeking ways, both on good policy grounds and on
grounds of self-interest, to impose greater checks on the
process.
The most common have been attempts to shorten the
time allowed to collect signatures or to require that some
signatures be collected in every county. In a number of
western states, voters have approved legislatively initiated
ballot measures, pushed hard by hunting and gun groups,
that either prohibit or severely curtail voter initiatives
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protecting wildlife. In Utah, the so-called "Cowboy Caucus"
managed to get voter approval for Proposition 5, a
constitutional amendment requiring that all future ballot
measures protecting wildlife be passed with a two-thirds vote.
The amendment was sold as a conservation measure; in the
words of Wayne Pacelle of the Humane Society, "[Tihe
advertisements [for Proposition 51 said not a word about the
supermajority requirement." For defenders of the initiative
who argue that the electorate always knows what it is voting
7
on, the irony here ought to be obvious.
More important, there are increasing indications that the
courts are becoming more active in checking the excesses of
initiative making, and particularly in enforcing the
requirement, common to most initiative states, that ballot
Although the
measures be confined to a single subject.'
from the
widely,
varied
have
standards and interpretations
to
readings
Florida Supreme Court's very restrictive
California's heretofore generally tolerant ones, even the
California Court seems now to be sending signals that it will
give measures stricter review. In December 1999, it knocked
a measure off the 2000 primary ballot that, in an effort to get
voter support for something they weren't particularly
interested in, combined changes in the state's redistricting
system with caps on legislative salaries. This was a clear
violation of the single subject rule, but one that might have
passed muster a decade before.
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Ron George seemed
to suggest precisely such a change of course. Alluding to law
review criticisms of the court's alleged failure to enforce the
single subject rule, he declared, "[T]he rule is neither devoid
of content nor as 'toothless' as some legal commentaries have
suggested."9 (I add this speculation advisedly in the hope of
7. See Wayne Pacelle, The Animal Protection Movement: A Modern-Day
Model Use of the Initiative Process, in M. Dane Waters, The Battle over Citizen
Lawmaking, 109-19 (2001).
8. See, e.g., Kenneth P. Miller, Courts as Watchdogs of the Washington
State InitiativeProcess, U. SEATLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
9. Senate v. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th 1142 (1999). See also Gerald F. Uelmen,
Taming the Initiative, CAL. LAW., Aug. 2000, at 46. How far that goes, of
course, is anyone's guess, since state judges generally are subject to periodic
reconfirmation votes. Thus, striking down a hot button issue, particularly one
approved by a substantial majority, leaves the judge feeling, as former
California Supreme Court Justice Joseph Grodin said, as if he's sitting with an
alligator in his bathtub.
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provoking further enlightenment from Chief Justice George
on this point). In the meantime, the federal courts have
struck down initiative-based attempts to write congressional
term limits into the U.S. Constitution. They have overturned
ballot measures in Oregon and Colorado that sought to
restrict homosexual rights. They have struck down most of
California's Proposition 187, which sought to deny schooling
and other services to illegal aliens and their children, as well
as measures on campaign finance reform and, more recently,
the California voter initiative establishing a "blanket"
primary."
However, most high-profile initiatives-on taxation,
legislative term limits, affirmative
action, criminal
sentencing, environmental regulation, bilingual educationhave survived pretty much intact. But because some were
temporarily blocked in trial courts and, in one case, by a three
judge appellate court panel, there has been considerable
backlash, including in some cases calls for impeachment of
judges or for requiring review by three judge district court
panels in cases involving the constitutionality of voterenacted laws. This has led scholars like Kenneth P. Miller to
warn that "as courts enforce constitutional norms and
invalidate initiatives at a high rate, the public may become
increasingly frustrated and may look for ways to undermine
the courts' independence."" As former Justice Otto Kaus said
in a now famous aphorism, for a state appellate justice
subject to periodic reconfirmation by the electorate, weighing
the constitutionality of an initiative is like having a crocodile
in the bathtub.
On the other side of this coin is the simple fact-the one
that stares all would-be initiative-process reformers in the
face-that the same courts, notwithstanding the complaints
about judicial activism coming from initiative defenders, have
given the process great deference, and often on similar
grounds. That deference goes back to 1912 when the U.S.
Supreme Court ducked the most fundamental question: Is
10. However, when it comes to campaign reform efforts, the courts have
given equally strict scrutiny to legislative acts as to those imposed by initiative.
11. See Kenneth P. Miller, Judging Ballot Initiatives: A Unique Role for the
Courts (Mar. 24, 2000) (unpublished manuscript prepared for presentation at

the 2000 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, on file
with author).
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direct democracy a violation of the guarantee clause? It ruled
that this is a political issue, not a legal one, and thus, beyond
its jurisdiction. 2 Since then the Supreme Court has ruled
that the First Amendment prohibits states from banning paid
signature gatherers, 3 and prohibits them from requiring that
they identify themselves by name, or even from the
requirement that they be voters in the states in which they
operate. 4 Given the fact that the electorate loves the
initiative process-according to polls, the voters have far
more confidence in policy making at the ballot box than
through representative state government-that leaves
reformers few choices other than sneaking fiddles past the
voters, or trying to restore some form of indirect initiative,
and/or requiring fuller and faster disclosure of who backs,
funds, and, where possible, opposes any given measure.
The problem in this debate, as with so many other
controversies surrounding the initiative process, is that there
are no normative criteria beyond the Constitution's general
protections for due process, free speech, and minority rights.
The great latitude that the courts permit in some states on
things like the single subject rule would be rejected out of
hand in others. Most states permit some sort of post-election
legislative amendment or even repeal of statutory initiatives,
but California does not. Some, which have the indirect
initiative, formally give legislatures a chance to act before a
measure goes on the ballot, but some do not.
The list of unresolved questions runs on and on. In
regard to all of these questions, the states vary widely: what
is a reasonable threshold for signatures-how many should
be required in what period of time and what is a reasonable
relationship between them? Who should have the authority
to write the ballot title and summary, where many voters get
their only information about a measure and which are
therefore often crucial in close elections, and what checks
12. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
Interestingly enough, in separate decisions, the Oregon courts ruled that
since-in that state-the legislature could amend or repeal statutory initiatives
after they pass, the initiative process did not violate the guarantee clause.
Inferentially, that begs the question in states like California, where the
legislature has no such authority.
13. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
14. See Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182
(1999).

948

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

should there be on that authority? In many cases, the first
action in a court comes from a dispute over how the
appropriate state official has captioned a measure. In some
states, no appeal to the courts is allowed. And what is the
difference between amending the constitution by initiative
(permitted in states like California) and revising it by
initiative, which is not permitted? Is the initiative itself a
normative element of American democracy or an increasingly
worrisome aberration?
If you like the process, not just in theory but as it is now
used, if you like the results, you are likely to be much more
restive if the legislature attempts to make access to the ballot
more difficult. If you don't like it, you may feel that the
courts have been far too obeisant to majority power, not just
on single subject, but in their failure to protect minorities
against majoritarian assaults on things like affirmative
action and bilingual education. Conservative critics who
attack judges as thwarting the will of the people for
modifying mandatory sentencing measures, or overturning
voter-approved restrictions on schooling or other public
services for illegal aliens, are not quite as certain when it
comes, for example, to the wave of successful initiatives
legalizing the medical use of marijuana.
Alongside these questions there are still others. As
Bruce Cain and Kenneth Miller have pointed out,'5 there is
implicit, though arguably sharp, disagreement even among
supporters of the process between those who regard it as a
progressive safety valve against legislative malfeasance or
inertia and those who see it as a populist alternative to all
representative government. Miller also argues quite cogently
that it is the populist-oriented measures-those that
challenge or limit established institutions-that have run
into particular difficulties in the courts. 6
As the power of our new information technologies
increases, as on-line voting and (probably) on-line petition
signature collection become real possibilities, and as reliance
on unmediated media such as talk shows, the Internet, and email grows, they are likely to create still greater public
restiveness about the relatively slow and seemingly
15. Bruce Cain & Kenneth Miller, The Populist Legacy: Initiatives and the
Underminingof Representative Government (forthcoming 2001).
16. See Miller, supra note 8.
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unresponsive traditional institutions, not only in government
but in other public institutions and services as well. This
makes the normative questions about the process ever more
In his recent book, Democracy Derailed,"
important.
Washington Post columnist David Broder, among our most
sophisticated and thoughtful political journalists, even
predicts that we will soon get some form of direct democracy
at the national level. Those of you who remember a maverick
U.S. Senator from Alaska named Mike Gravel from the early
1970s may be interested to know that Senator Gravel now
has an organization named Philadelphia II that aims to do
precisely that, albeit so far with little success.
But whether or not Broder's prediction is correct, he is
surely right in his finding that in state after state, voters
show widespread disdain for their legislatures. Broder says
that when he asked Oregon voters, who twice balloted on
initiatives, whether such a
physician-assisted-suicide
fundamental ethical issue should simply be subject to the
decision of a fifty percent-plus-one majority, "they looked at
me like I was crazy." How else to decide something of this
importance? Here is a whole generation raised on the speed,
responsiveness, and inter-activity of the web and weaned on
the unmediated and inherently anti-establishment media of
the chat room and the talk show, confronting the deliberate
nature, the slowness, and often the non-responsiveness of
conventional government. That growing dichotomy and the
restiveness it produces is something we had better all pay
attention to. The initiative process is not going away; if
anything, it will become a larger factor.

17. DAVID BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE
POWER OF MONEY (2000).

